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* This is the revised version of the paper presented as a background material for the 
wrapping up session at the Hitotsubashi Workshop on Corporate Governance held during 
February 27-28 in 2004 in Tokyo. Many thanks to the comments by my colleagues, by the 
participants to the workshop, and by the participants in the Asian Economic Panel held in 
Keio University in Tokyo during 7-8 March, 2005; In particular, Barry Eichengreen, Yutaka 
Kosai, Takashi Kurosaki, Kyung-Tae Lee, Anwar Nastion, Hiroshi Ono, Osamu Saito and 
Richard Wong.     Summary 
  The evolution of investor right in Japan is examined in a historical perspective since the 
prewar period and in relation to the evolution in firm-specific skill formation.  First, we 
will show that the investment in firm-specific skills spread from the top to the bottom in a 
firm system. Second, we will show that the delegation of control right of physical assets to 
employees was caused in order to accommodate the rapid technological changes. The weak 
investor right in Japan evolved through a rational choice of asset holders (shareholders and 
landlords), who delegated part of control right over their assets to actual producers 
(managers, workers, and tenant farmers) in order to maximize the benefits of firm-specific 
skill formation by them. A cautious approach is needed in adjusting the investor right to 
global standards: a stronger investor right would enhance allocation efficiency of financial 



























 11.  Introduction 
 
    During the high growth period of Japan, the right of investors, shareholders in particular, 
was severely restricted; In terms of income right, a part of residual income was shared with 
workers in the from of bonus payment depending on the profitability of firms, and in terms 
of control right, the power of shareholders was curtailed through the intense 
cross-shareholding among related firms and because of various regulations on capital 
markets.    These characteristics, moreover, are kept in tact by and large until now, in spite 
of noticeable changes such as a significant reduction in cross-shareholding related to 
financial institutions.   
  Globalization of financial markets since the 1980s is a serious challenge to the 
desirability and sustainability of the system of weak investor right1in Japan. It is often 
claimed that in order to promote international portfolio investment, homogenization of 
economic institutions and regulatory environment among economies is indispensable, and 
that in order to activate cross-boarder mergers and acquisitions it is necessary to realize 
equal and high level protection of investor right among firms of different nationalities. If 
we should follow this kind of reasoning, there is no doubt that the weak investor right in 
Japan should be rectified in some way, so as to be aligned to global standards.   
The policy stance of the Japanese government in this regard lies in the positive 
adjustment of the Japanese system to the global standard at least after the initiation of the 
financial Big Bang in 1997.  So-called structural adjustment policy includes followings 
with respect to investor right: further deregulation of capital markets, introduction of 
market-value principle in corporate accounting, and introduction of American type board 
system characterized by the separation of execution and monitoring of management. The 
theoretical ground for these policies, however, does not seem to have been articulated fully.  
In particular, there has not been any convincing explanations with respect to why these 
policies are effective in promoting investor protection, nor has been as to why 
strengthening of investor right is needed in the Japanese economic system from now on.                 
In this paper, we will suggest that a more cautious approach is needed in this respect: In 
terms of the effectiveness of reform policy, the system of weak investor right is rooted in 
more deep historical tradition and path dependency is stronger, and in terms of the 
desirability of stronger investor protection, the balance of costs and benefits of the 
                                                  
1  This does not necessarily mean that legal system in Japan regarding investor right is weak in 
international comparison. Instead, owing to the de facto protection of the management by 
cross-shareholding, de jury protection of the management has been quite weak until recently. Existing 
literature such as Fukao and Morita (1997), Goto (1993) and Horiuchi and Hanazaki (2000) claim that 
legal protection of investor in Japan has been stronger than in the US in many respects.  On the other 
hand, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1978) classifies Japan as German tradition in terms 
of legal origin of investor protection, and this means weaker protection of investor right compared with 
Anglo-American countries. 
 2protection is more delicate and less self-evident, than is commonly believed. 
   With respect to the efficiency implication of investor right protection, the government 
policies seem to be guided by a simple-minded faith in the economic gains brought about by 
the efficient allocation of resources. There is no doubt that a stronger protection of investor 
right is desirable in the sense of enhancing allocation efficiency.  Active participation by 
individual investors in capital market transaction would be welfare-improving through 
direct representation of the tastes of consumer-asset holders.  Unfettered flow of funds 
facilitated by standardized investor right system would allocate resources more efficiently 
in international markets.  However, these benefits in allocation efficiency must be 
evaluated against the influence on organizational efficiency of investor right system.  The 
degree of investor right affects efficiency of individual organization through its effects on 
the incentives to invest in firm-specific managerial and production skills.  As Hart (1995) 
indicates, whenever contracts are incomplete owing to transaction costs regarding 
negotiating and writing contracts, hold-up problems arise, retarding investment in 
firms-specific skills.  In this case, granting residual control right entirely to the owner of 
firms (owner of cash-flow right) is not necessarily optimal.  A trade-off relationship exists 
between organizational efficiency owing to firm-specific skills and allocation efficiency 
through open capital markets.  A stronger investor right would be conducive to more 
efficient allocation of resources through capital markets. However, it could be detrimental 
to organizational efficiency through reducing incentive for investment in firm-specific skills 
by managers and workers.  A weaker investor right could retard the development of 
capital markets. To the extent that workers cannot shift to other companies smoothly due 
to the firm-specific nature of their skills, allocation efficiency of labor markets is also 
affected adversely. However, conferment of part of control right to employees could be 
efficiency-enhancing in the sense of organizational efficiency as far as it gives them 
incentives for firm-specific skill formation.  It is often argued that the postwar high 
growth of Japan was not possible without process and product innovation based on 
investment in firms-specific skills by workers at shop-floors.  Further, we will suggest 
below that without investment by managers in firm-specific skills, the growth rate of 
prewar Japan would have not been so high.  If Japan want to pursue the similar growth 
strategy in the future, a stronger investor right or the depriving workers of control right of 
firms might not necessarily be a sensible policy.  The trade-off between allocation 
efficiency and organizational efficiency could be a focal issue for the future growth strategy 
for the Japanese economy.     
    With respect to the effectiveness of the reform policy regarding the weak investor right in 
Japan, the government policy seems to have been guided by the conventional way of 
understanding about the origin of weak investor right.  It ascribes the origin to three 
things:  
 3(i) Suppression of stockholder’s right in terms of both residual income and control right 
during the wartime (the New Economic Region during 1940–41 and the production 
manager sovereignty system during 1943–45). 
(ii) Cross-shareholding as a response by managers of ex-zaibatsu firms to the surge of 
rampant hostile take-over movements caused by “security democratization” (sale out of 
stock confiscated from zaibatsu to the public) immediately after the war, and to the threat 
of merger by foreign firms after the capital liberalization in 1964. 
 (iii) Continued regulation on capital markets by bureaucrats for the sake of credit 
rationing to key industries. 
  In short, the conventional understanding assumes that investor right in Japan was 
weakened because bureaucrats and the military suppressed shareholder right and 
suffocated the capital markets, and because rent-seeking corporate managers seized the 
opportunity of entrenching themselves and pursuing private benefits during the turmoil 
after the war defeat and at the time of capital liberalization.    As far as one believes in this 
theory, it is reasonable to consider that weak investor right in Japan could be rectified by 
such measures as disciplining of managers by independent outside monitoring mechanism 
and by marking the value of cross-shareholding to the market as well as liberalizing capital 
markets from the control by bureaucrats.     
  H o w e v e r ,  i t  m u s t  b e  n o t e d that the conventional theory was derived from casual 
observations of historical incidents during the wartime and thereafter and lacks coherency 
at least in the following sense.  For one thing, while the theory emphasizes the 
rent-seeking behavior of managers, it never refers to the behavior and incentive of 
shareholders.  It is true that due to the zaibatsu  dissolution and the purge of “war 
criminals”, the existing shareholders suffered from a severe blow immediately after the war 
(Teranishi 2005).  However, in 1949, 69.1 percent of shares of listed companies were held 
by individual investors, so that large firms were truly public at that time.  Why investors 
did not oppose the move to cross-shareholding that restricts their control power?    It is true 
that in widely-held companies the incentive of shareholders to monitor is usually weak2. 
However, this caused continued and intense rivalry between shareholders and 
managements in the US since the beginning of the twentieth century. Why same thing did 
not occur in Japan? The conventional theory does not address itself to this question. For 
another, the explanation by the conventional theory lacks coherent explanation about the 
relationship between investor right and firm-specific skill formation.  It admits that the 
two are related with each other somehow in the Japanese-style firm system or in the 
framework of a stakeholder society.  However, it never clarified the mechanism in which 
                                                  
2  Because of zaibatsu dissolution and land reform immediately after the war wealthy families disappeared 
suddenly from Japan. This rendered the problem caused by the absence of controlling shareholders more 
serious in Japan than in other countries.       
 4both weak investor right and firm-specific skill formation are generated endogenously. 
Some researchers refer to long-term employment as a cause for firm-specific skill formation. 
However, promising to employ lifetime does not necessarily resolve hold-up problem (Gilson 
and Roe 1999)3.  Credibility of the promise must be guaranteed in some way. Other 
researchers treat the development of firm-specific skill largely as an exogenous factor: the 
laborious research by Koike (1997) has clarified that firm-specific skill formation by 
workers became prevalent during the late 1950s and 1960s as regular job rotation system 
was introduced in order to accommodate demand fluctuations and unexpected absence of 
workers; Similarly, Aoki (1990) considers that firm-specific skill formation is closely related 
to the flow mechanism of information in a firm that is treated by and large as a 
characteristic exogenously endowed in Japan, and focuses on the information-sharing by 
workers at shop-floor level and the consequent formation of firm-specific skills.     
  In this paper, we will examine the evolution of investor right in Japan in a historical 
perspective since the prewar period.  We will suggest that the weak investor right in 
Japan evolved through a rational choice of asset holders (shareholders and landlords), who 
delegated part of control right over their assets to actual producers (managers, workers, 
and tenant farmers) in order to maximize the benefits of firm-specific skill formation by 
them. 
  First, we will show that the investment in firm-specific skills spread from the top to the 
bottom in a firm system.    At first, top managers became involved in the growth of firms in 
the Meiji period4. Then, formation of firm-specific skill and devotion to firm growth spread 
to the middle management during and after World War I, and finally workers at shop-floor 
level came to be involved in the investment in firm-specific skills after  World War II.  At 
the top-management level, the hold-up problem was avoided partly by resorting to loyalty 
sentiment due to the reminiscence of feudalistic relationship, and partly by the value 
system of the society that emphasized the role of actual producers and managers and 
degraded mere rentiers.  With respect to the middle management, the experience of top 
management made the promise of long-term employment credible, so they were given 
incentives to invest in skill formation.  Likewise, the hold-up problem of shop-floor 
workers was prevented because of  the experience of top and middle managers.  Allen 
and Gale (2000) show that, when a team with overlapping generation structure is 
organized, and team members invest in firm-specific skills, all the managers and 
employees tend to follow long-term maximizing behavior, and that this is consistent with 
                                                  
3  Gilson and Roe considers, instead, the lack of open labor market as a cause for the prevention of hold-up 
problem and the formation of firm-specific skill. Further, they argue that the absence of open labor market 
was caused by the political mechanism in which a coalition of conservative party and the corporate 
managers has introduced lifetime employment system in order to bring about labor peace. Teranishi (2005) 
examines this hypothesis critically.  
4  1868-1912. 
 5the request for share value maximization by shareholders.  In their theory, both 
overlapping management structure and firm-specific skill formation are treated as two 
independent assumptions. The two evolved in close relationship with each other in the 
historical process 
  Second, we will show that the delegation of control right of physical assets to employees 
was caused in order to accommodate the rapid technological changes.   In the case of three 
large zaibatsu, the necessity to diversify their business to new technological field, heavy 
and chemical industries, necessitated organizational reforms, and control right were 
conferred to professional managers.    In the case of prewar leading firms in textile and food 
processing industries, control right was substantially delegated to educated middle 
managers in order to improve product quality and develop new products in the face of the 
intensification of competition in the world markets.    Likewise, rice production was an area 
of most rapid technological progress in prewar Japan.  Landlords were obliged to confer 
substantial control right to tenant farmers, and tried to reap the fruit of firm (land)-specific 
skill investment by them.     
It is important to note that from the viewpoint of historical analysis it is not the 
rent-seeking behavior of employees but the maximizing behavior of asset holders that 
caused the transfer of control right and the consequent weakening of investor right.  In 
the case of the postwar development of cross-shareholding also, it does not seem to be 
pertinent simply to ascribe it to the private-benefit based behavior by managers.  It could 
be argued that most of stakeholders including widely dispersed individual shareholders 
shared the view that product and process innovation based on firms-specific investment by 
workers was the best way to maximize firm values, which was conducive to share value 
maximization in the long run. 
  Rajan and Zinglass (2000) argues that as the importance of knowledge and human 
capital increased in the modern society, the traditional modern business enterprises 
examined by Chandler (1977) and Berle and Means (1932) are now converted into firms as 
nexus of firm-specific skills.    The control right in the hand of the owner of physical capital 
is shifting to the owners of human capital, they argue.  In the case of Japan, a catch-up 
country, where import and modification of foreign technology was a key strategy for 
corporate growth, human capital increased its importance prior to the advent of knowledge 
economy in the sense of Rajan and Zinglus.  It will be also shown below that, partly for 
this reason, while the organization of modern business in the world of Chandler took the 
form of vertically organized firm integrating all the up-stream and down-stream activities 
and concentrating all the decision at the central office, the large businesses in Japan took a 
more decentralized system delegating decision rights to individual factory level.   
  In sum, we will argue that the weak investor right in Japan evolved as a process of 
organizational reform in order to provide with adequate incentives to the various segments 
 6of  organizations.  It  was  compatible  with  the  aim  of  corporate  growth  and                 
probably with the desire for macroeconomic growth. It would be quite difficult to change it 
merely by imposing new regulatory framework or just letting private-benefit oriented 
managers to wear straight-jackets.  It is also necessary to note that the choice between 
strong or weak investor right is closely related to the overall growth strategy of the 
Japanese economy; If the government want to resort to a growth based on allocation 
efficiency, it must choose policies that promote stronger investor right, and if a growth 
based on organizational efficiency is pursued, it must accommodate weakness of investor 
right in its policy choice.     
    Next section analyzes the evolution of investor right since the prewar period, and the last 







2.    Evolution of Investor Right    
 
  This section is composed of two parts.  The first section deals with the evolution of 
long-term employment and firm-specific investment by top and middle management, and 
the next section is devoted to the factors affecting the delegations of control right to actual 
produces. 
  In deriving the two propositions introduced above, we will examine the evolution of 
corporate governance system with respect to three types of “firms”; three largest zaibatsu 
firms (Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo), large manufacturing firms in cotton textile 
industry, and the farm sector under tenancy system.  In order to understand the reasons 
for focusing on these three types of firms or organizations, data on the relative importance 
of farm sector, light industries and heavy and chemical industries are shown in Table 1.  
The agricultural sector or farm sector comprised 41.5 percent of GDP of the country in 1888. 
Since the agriculture was related to various kinds of indigenous manufacturing and 
commercial activities (typically raw silk and tea), Japan was basically an agrarian economy 
at least until the 1920s.  The light industries were leading industries in prewar Japan.  
These included textile (cotton spinning), food products, paper and pulp, cement, sugar 
refinery, and so on.  Among ten largest companies5 in 1918 in terms of total assets, four 
were cotton spinning companies, and one was sugar refinery, for example (Fruin 1992).  
                                                  
5  Kawasaki Shipyards, Kuhara Mining, Mitsubishi shipyards, Kanegafuchi Spinning, Toyo Spinning, 
Dai-Nihon Spinning, Taiwan Sugar Manufacturing, Mitsubishi Steel, Fuji Gas Spinning, and Japan Steel.   
 7The share of textile and food products in total manufacturing production was as high as 
38.1 percent even in 1938.  The growth of heavy and chemical industries started at the 
time of World War I, and accelerated during the period of World War II and thereafter.  
The three large zaitatsu accumulated their wealth through business in mining, banking, 
trading and marine transportation.  Gradually, they invested their accumulated earnings 
in new fields, mainly in heavy and chemical industries.  Table 2 traces the process of 
diversification of businesses of three largest zaibatsu.  It is seen that the share of heavy 
and chemical industries rose to 63 percent at the end of World War II.6 
 
(1)    From Top, to Middle, and then to Shop-floor   
  The strict restriction of investor right in postwar Japan due to cross-shareholding was 
actually the third phase of the long-term trial and error process to reallocate control right of 
corporate firms since the Meiji period. At first, control right was conferred to professional 
top managers, then to the middle management, and finally to blue-collar workers at the 
shop-floor. 
   
  Top  Management 
    The first phase was concerned with the control right of top managers.   During the Meiji 
period, control right was delegated to professional managers both in zaibatsu firms and 
large cotton spinning firms.  Three big zaibatsu were most active in recruiting 
professional managers, and granting them substantially autonomy.  As Takahashi (1977) 
emphasizes, zaibatsu firms vigorously recruited high ranking government officials as well 
as promising young intellectuals, mostly sons of ex-samurai class and educated in leading 
universities, domestic and overseas, as top managers.  They paid high salary and 
extraordinary amount of bonus for successful achievement to the hired managers7.  The 
wage level of zaibatsu workers had been much lower compared with government officials in 
early Meiji period, but at least after late Meiji period, the salary of the top management 
became as high as high-ranking government officials. 
    Table 3 shows bonus payment to managers and dividend payment as percentages to 
profit after tax with respect to zaibatsu firms and non-zaibatsu firms.  The percentage of 
manager bonus is as high as 5.3 percent for zaibatsu firms and 4.8 percent for non-zaibatsu 
                                                  
6 Another big zaibatsu Yasuda was concerned mainly with financial industries.  The so-called Taisho 
zaibatsu such as Furukawa, Suzuki, and Asano followed pattern of diversification similar to the three 
largest. The new zaibatsu that grew rapidly after the 1930s such as Nissan, Nichitsu, Riken, Mori and 
Nisso focused more in heavy and chemical industries.     
7  For example, senior managing director (senmu-torishimari yaku) Hikojiro Nakamigawa of Mitsui Bank 
requested 10 percent of bank profits for his job at the bank, and the bonus of Toyoji Wada, senior managing 
director of Fuji Spinning (later Fuji Gas Spinning), was 300 thousand yen when total profit of the company 
was 3 million yen in 1905 ( Yui and Hirschmeier 1977). 
 
 8firms.  Generally, zaibatsu firms paid more as bonus payment to managers and less as 
dividend to stockholder compare with non-zaibatsu firms.   
  Contribution of professional managers to the growth of zaibatsu was substantial.  It is 
true that some of large zaibatsu were established by aggressive and active founders such as 
Yatarô Iwasaki, Zenjirô Yasuda, Ichibee Furukawa, Sôichirô Asano and Kihachirô Ôkura.  
However, the growth of zaibatsu after establishment owes crucially to the managerial 
human resource procured from outside.8 Morikawa (1980) raises following cases as 
evidence for the importance of managerial skill for zaibatsu growth.   
(i) Failure of Ono-gumi and Konoike to become zaibatsu owing to the lack of modern 
managerial resources 
( i i )  C r i s i s  o f  M i t s u i  z a i b a t s u  b e f o r e  t h e  h i r i n g  o f  H i k o j i r ô  N a k a m i g a w a 9 as a top 
executive in 1891. 
(iii) Stagnation of Sumitomo zaibatsu before the resignation of traditional housekeeper in 
1883, and the modernization of managerial system led by Masaya Suzuki10 and Kin’ichi 
Kawakami11 and  others.  
(iv) Successful diversification of businesses outside copper mining and high growth of 
Sumitomo zaibatsu in the twentieth century led by a powerful modern managerial team, 
and the failure of Furukawa zaibatsu in expanding business outside copper mining after 
the death of Ichibee Furukawa in 1903 due to complicated internal struggle among family 
members and top managers. 
  As is well known, in Mitsubishi zaibatsu Yanosuke Iwasaki, younger brother of Founder 
Yatarô Iwasaki, played a leading role in the management, but his successful leadership is 
said to owe substantially to the groups of capable modern managers led by Heigorô Sôda.  
In the case Mitsui, the eleven families intervened in the managerial strategy frequently.  
It is sometimes claimed that the internal struggle between the families and hired 
managerial team caused a conservative behavior of the group in expanding business in 
heavy and chemical industries.  However Morikawa (1977) claims that the decentralized 
decision mechanism based on three powerful leading companies, Mitsui Bank, Mitsui 
Bussan and Mitsui Kôzan, and the conflict of interests among them was the main cause of 
Mitsui’s turmoil in strategic decision making.  It goes without saying that in the case of 
Sumitomo, the family showed any interest in business matters12 and all the power was 
delegated to hired managers.     
  A similar phenomenon of delegation of control power to professional managers occurred 
                                                  
8  Some of them became insiders of zaibatsu family through marriage after their successful achievement.   
9 President of Sanyo Railway Co., previously chief of a bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, educated 
in England. 
10  Former high ranking official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, invited to Sumitomo in 1897. 
11  Former director of Bank of Japan, invited to Sumitomo in 1899. 
12  The interest of the family was in philanthropy and arts. 
 9also with respect to leading cotton spinning companies.  Most of cotton spinning 
companies had been established as joint investment companies by rich merchants and 
industrialists, many of them engaged in textile-related businesses.  During early period, 
these firms had been managed by directors selected from large shareholders.  Since the 
number of shareholders was small,13  the consensus-based control by large shareholder was 
effectively implemented.  As the international competition of the industry intensified, 
however, these shareholder-managers were also replaced by professional managers.  For 
example, in Kanegafuchi Spinning, Sanji Mutô, a graduate of Keio University and an 
American University  ( Pacific University in California), was invited from Mitsui Bank, 
and became senior managing director in 1908.14  In Fuji Spinning, Toyoji Wada was 
recruited from Kanegafuchi Spinning, the largest company in the industry, as the senior 
managing director 1901 and became president of Fuji Gas Spinning15 in 1916.  He was 
also a graduate of Keio University and from ex-samu ai family.  The rise of professional 
managers in corporate control is clear from the data in panel A of Table 4.  It can be seen 
that companies which hired more than two professional managers increase from 5 out of 75 
in 1905 to 113 out of 158 in 1930.     
r
 
  Middle  Managements 
    After the 1920s, there occurred the second phase of the delegation of control right.    This 
time, the middle management and white-collar workers increased their control power.  
First, seniority wage system and life-time employment system spread among middle 
managements of large firms.  Ono (1989) points out that seniority wage and internal 
promotion system became common among large firms, and raises three reasons for the 
phenomenon; the necessity to secure skilled labor through OJT, an increase in the share of 
male workers owing to the development of heavy and chemical industry,16 and the 
necessity to insulate skilled labor from labor movements.  Odaka (1993) also claim that 
among white collar workers lifetime employment and seniority wage system became 
prevalent during the same period, while blue-collar workers were quite often fired during 
the prewar period by the convenience of companies even if they were skilled workers. 
  Second, the share of internally promoted employees increased in board members, and at 
the same time board members became integrated with management members.  For 
example, in 1921 Sanji Mutô of Kanegafuchi Spinning revised the article of association at 
the shareholder’s meeting and introduced following rules; (i) president and directors must 
                                                  
13 With respect to 63 cotton spinning companies, average number of shareholder was 347 with maximum 
1,114 and minimum 29 in 1898 (Murakami 1970).     
14  And became president in 1921. 
15  Established in 1916 through a merger of Fuji Spinning with other spinning companies. 
16  Ono claims that indexing to living cost was needed for male workers who were major income earners in 
household.   
 10be chosen among those who had worked for the company more than five years and (ii) 
part-time members cannot became board members.  Similar reform took place at Tôyê 
Spinning, another leading cotton spinning company, in 1922, and Kurashiki Spinning, Fuji 
Gas spinning and Nishin spinnig as well (Yui 1995).  Panel (B) of Table 4 shows that 
number of companies in which more than one-third of board members are composed of 
professional managers increased from 19 out of 69 in 1915 to 45 out of 65 companies in 
1930.  Further, panel (C) shows that among professional managers internally promoted 
member increased from 8 out of 36 in 1905 to 247 out of 470 managers in 1930. 
  Third, there occurred a substantial decentralization of control power and decision 
making (Yui 1995).    Factories dispersed in local areas increased autonomy, and as a result 
middle management at factories obtained significant discretion in decision making.    Many 
of factories became equipped with managerial capability with specialized sections including 
purchasing of materials, labor management, accounting, and so on.  Many promising 
university graduates were delegated to factories, and being a section chief at major 
factories became an elite course in the career path.  It is natural that they found 
instrumental value in the growth of firms, and devoted to the growth of firms through 
investing in firm-specific shills.   
    In sum, in the prewar period, shareholders right was weakened first by the delegation of 
control right to professional managers, and then to the middle management.  It is worth 
noting that in the case of United State the emergence of “managerial capitalism” or the rise 
of powerful top management owes to the separation of ownership and management and 
hence entailed serious agency problem between the dispersed shareholders and the top 
management, while in Japan the rise of professional managers occurred without such a 
separation of ownership and management; i.e. family-owned zaibatsu and joint-investment 
style companies. 
 
  Blue-Collar  Workers 
    With the backdrop of this, there came the third phase of reallocation of control right after 
World War II.  The experience during and immediately after World War II bears special 
importance here (Teranishi 2005).  Munitions production required accelerated 
technological progress and improvement in heavy and chemical industries. In order to 
improve the production process and quality control, it was crucial to promote the formation 
of firm-specific skills by workers and factory managers. The military paid significant efforts 
to strengthen the autonomy of the factory managers, and this culminated in the 
enforcement of the Munitions Financing Designated Financial Institution System in 
January 1944. In this system, a production chief in each factory could finance necessary 
fund from designated financial institutions at his will, could substitute the approval at 
shareholder meeting by the approval by the Ministry in charge of the factory, and could 
 11decline the disclosure of information. At the same time the military tried to promote the 
incentive for firm-specific skill formation by workers at shop-floor. They intervened in wage 
system so as to increase the share of fixed wages or living-cost compensation. Long-term 
employment was also encouraged as far as the factory obeyed the compulsory reallocation 
of workers for the military purpose. 
Partly owing to this wartime experience and to the experience of overcoming intense 
labor disputes immediately after the war, blue-collar workers came to be treated equally 
with white collar workers in the postwar period.  Both lifetime employment and seniority 
wage system was applied to them also.  Since the top and the middle management are 
already lifetime employed and they are actively investing firm-specific managerial skills, it 
was natural for blue-collar workers to have incentives to invest in firm-specific skill.  The 
promise of life-time employment and seniority based wage system, which was composed of 
living-cost part as well as experience and skill based part (Teranishi 2005), was credible, 
and hence, hold-up problems were avoided.   
  Since almost all the managers and board members came to be composed of internally 
promoted members in the postwar period, it was not necessary to pay extraordinary high 
income to the top management, so that the percentage of bonus payments to profits was 
reduced substantially to less than one percent as is shown in Table 5.    Instead, in order to 
give incentives to workers at shop-floor and the middle management to invest in 
firm-specific skill, bonus payment or the sharing of residual income with them was 
substantially increased; 35.3 percent in 1970 and 49.8 percent in 1980 of the sum of profit 
after tax and bonus to regular employees.     
    Owing to the virtual disappearance of the wealthy zaibatsu family and their commitment 
in corporate governance, new top managers and board members, promoted from the 
position of factory chiefs or directors, took the role of firm growth.  When some hostile 
takeover attempts occurred, it was natural for them to cope with them by 
cross-shareholding among ex-zaibatsu firms, which were crossly related with each other 
both technologically and in terms of human relationship. 
 
  Hold-Up  Problem 
  So far, we have argued that control right of firms was delegated to the top management 
at first, then to the middle management, and finally to shop-floor workers.  Lifetime 
employment and investment in firm-specific skills spread in this order.    This explains why 
hold-up problem did not occur.  For the middle management, the long-term employment 
and high salary of top managers was convincing evidence that they can recover cost of 
investment in firms-specific skills in the future.  For blue-collar workers, the internal 
promotion and seniority wages of the middle management made the promise by the 
company of lifetime employment a credible one.  In this way, overlapping generation 
 12structure (Allen and Gale 2000) came into existence.  However  this  raises a question: How 
about the top management?  Why they believed that their efforts and investments could 
be recovered in the future?  Let me answer this question with respect to zaibatsu case.  
One of the clues to this question is quasi-feudal relationship between zaibatsu family and 
house butler-type top managers.  Before the recruitment of top-managers from the 
bureaucracy or Bank of Japan, management of zaibatsu was in the hand of house –butlers, 
who were still tied with the family with quasi-feudal loyalty sentiment.    However, another 
and probably more fundamental reason is the atmosphere to degrade merchant and 
assetholder class compared with ex-samurai and actual producers.   In order to clarify this 
point, let us start with pre-Meiji, feudal period.  We will show that the majority of the top 
management recruited from outside zaibatsu was ex-samurai or from other related classes, 
which had social grade higher than merchant class including zaibatsu families.   
Let us start with pre-Meiji, feudal period.  During this period there was a strict class 
system among occupations.  There were four categories in occupations, and the highest 
was the samurai, the second was farmers, and the third was manufactures or engineers, 
followed by merchants.  It is interesting to note that the ruling class of the feudal Japan, 
the samurai class, was not asset holders. This is quite different from European case, where 
ruling class was a huge wealth owing class.  Most of financial assets were held by 
merchants, and land was held by farmers; small owner-cultivating farmers called 
hyakusho and emerging landlords.  The ruling class had only taxation right, and did not 
possess any significant income-yielding properties.  Partly for this reason, during the 
feudal period investor’s right was not necessarily respected.  The rulers (chief of feudal 
clan) as well as lower class samurai   borrowed heavily from merchants, and the lending 
contracts were quite often cancelled by formal decrees in order to restore fiscal condition of 
the fief governments as well as to relieve samurais and peasants in poverty. 
The Meiji Restoration in 1868, which threw away the feudal system and introduced 
modern capitalism, was implemented by lower class samurai in the South-Western region 
of Japan.  Among the various measures to modernize the economy, joint-stock company 
system was introduced, and national banks (nationally-chartered private banks) were the 
first joint-stock companies.  Starting from the establishment of four banks in 1874, 153 
national banks were established by 1879. 
Three characteristics in the corporate system of national banks are worth noting.  First 
is the investors in banks.    As is clarified by Asakura (1961),    most banks were established 
by rich merchants and landlords.17  They invested in banks and other modern businesses 
in order to profit from new investment opportunities provided by the expansion of markets, 
                                                  
17  Ex-rulers of feudal fiefs also invested their money substantially.    Meiji government gave national bonds 
to them in order to compensate for confiscating taxation right from them.   The National Banking Act in 
1876 was aimed to facilitate their investment in national banks in the form of bond instead  of  species.     
 13domestic and overseas (Teranishi, 2003 and 2005).    Second is the role of ex- amurai in the 
management of banks. Many of ex-samurai, who lost jobs as rulers, became bureaucrats, 
joined the military, and the rest became managers of newly established modern firms.  In 
the case of fourteen national banks with main offices in Tokyo city, there were 62 managers 
all together, of which, 39 managers were ex-samurai
s
                                                 
18, and managers of three banks out of 
fourteen were entirely composed by ex-samurai.  Third, voting right of large shareholders 
was severely restricted in national banks.    In other words, one-share one-vote rule was not 
applied, and shareholders received one vote for the first 10 shares they owned, one vote for 
every 5 additional shares they held up to 100 shares, and one vote for every 10 additional 
shares they owned over 100 shares.  Incidentally, before the promulgation of 1893 
Commercial Law, it was a common practice to curtail voting right (control right) of large 
shareholders, as is shown in Table7: the share of corporations, which did not restrict large 
shareholders’ voting right or adopted one-vote one-share system, was 6% during 1877–85, 
15% 1886–89, and 31% during 1890–1892; after the promulgation of the Commercial Law 
in 1893, the share rose to more than sixty percent.  Voting  right were curtailed by various 
measures; national bank or Nihon-Yusen style19 method was most common, and in some 
cases a maximum was set on the number of votes that a shareholder can exercise.   
According to Imuta (1976), the restriction of voting right was endorsed and recommended 
by the government.    Since the government was established by ex-samurai, it might not be 
far out of mark to conjecture that the government intended to protect manager’s position in 
modern corporations.  The government seems to be ambivalent; they were eager to 
mobilize accumulated funds at the hand of rich merchants and landlords, but at the same 
time, they did not want to give much power to investors. This was partly because 
ex-samurai government bureaucrats valued highly to serve companies as organizations 
without pursuing any private benefits (Takahashi, 1977, p. 158), but mainly because they 
had value system that emphasizes social value of actual producers and managers compared 
with merchants or rentiers.    
Three reservations are in order.   First, many of managers of ex-samurai origin obtained 
huge bonus from the companies they run and many of them became large stockholders 
later, during the Taisho-Showa period, as they invested their income into stocks.  Second, 
one-share one-vote became common after the revision of commercial Law in 1893.  Third, 
the restriction of voting right was not special in Japan.  In the eighteen century United 
Kingdom, for example, one vote for one person was a common practice.  In the United 
Stats, it was common among banks to restrict maximum number of votes to ten per person 
 
18 Sixteen banks were established in Tokyo.  But one of them does not have sufficient data, and the 
fifteenth banks were an outlier in this case because it was established exclusively by nobility.  Refer to 
Takahashi (1977) on these points. 
19 According to the article of Nihon-Yusen revised in 1883, shareholders received one vote for the first 10 
shares they owned and, one vote for every 5 additional share they held.  
 14during the eighteenth century.  In the mid-nineteen century, however, one-share one-vote 
rule was established as a norm.  In Meiji Japan there seems to be no doubt that the 
government had information about the evolution process of voting right system in thes 
countries.   Nevertheless, the government tried to curtail the voting right of large 
shareholders.    
 
 
(2)    Maximizing Behavior of Asset-holders and Technological Progress 
 
  Why control right has been delegated to employees by shareholders?  A readily 
conceivable reason is the rest-seeking behavior by managers and workers.  Although this 
factor cannot be denied completely, we consider that major driving forces toward 
weakening of shareholder right lie in rapid technological changes and the necessity to 
accommodate them by means of organizational reforms. 
 
  Zaibatsu  Firms 
  In the case of zaibatsu firms, the main reason came from urgent needs to go into heavy 
and chemical industries.    During the nineteenth century, the three zaibatsu expanded and 
diversified their business into traditional profitable businesses such as mining, marine 
transportation, foreign trade and banking.  Since these were areas to which the new 
government devoted most effort in order to modernize the economy, three zaibatsu families 
with close contact with the government leaders were quite successful in these businesses.  
It is well known that the privatization of state enterprises started in 1885 benefited them 
greatly.  After the turn of the century, it has become clear that further growth of zaibatsu 
was possible only through launching new businesses in the areas of heavy and chemical 
industries; they had accumulated huge amount of retained profits, and light industries 
such as textiles and food products had already been started by smaller indigenous 
industrialists other than zaibatsu.  Thus, both Mitsui and Mitsubishi decided to go into 
steel production in 1913, and Sumitomo that had already a steel factory in Niihama 
(Shikoku) since 1892 bought a big iron factory in 1901, and went into steel pipe production 
after 1912.    Data on diversification into heavy and chemical industries is given in Table. 2.   
It was after the 1920s that zaibatsu entered into the area actively.     
  Organization reform was needed in order to realize efficient management of diversified 
business (Takeda 1995) and in order to make pertinent decision about the launching of new 
businesses (Okazaki 1999).   The establishment of holding companies were landmark for 
the organizational reform for these purposes.  Table 6 shows most zaibatsu established 
holding companies by the end of the World War I period.   
  Holding companies held huge power through controlling internal capital and labor 
 15markets: All the investment projects needed to be approved by holding companies, 
although drawing up of project draft was left to individual professional managers 
(Miyajima 2004);  All the new graduates from universities hired by zaibatsu became 
employees of holding companies at first , and allocated to group companies thereafter. 
  Establishment of holding companies was implemented  by  top professional managers 
under the monitoring by zaibatsu families. Takashi Masuda led the process with close 
consultation with eleven Mitsui owner-families in the case of Mitsui.  In the case of 
Mitsubishi, Koyata Iwasaki (eldest son of Yanosuke Iwasaki, who was a younger brother of 
the founder Yatarô Iwasaki) took the leadership.  In the case of Sumitomo, the 
professional manager Masaya Suzuki took the leadership under the approval of 
Kichizaemon Sumitomo, who owned 98.7 percent of the assets of the Sumitomo-Gôshi.   
    How much power the owner families retained in the operation of holding companies is an 
interesting question.  Yasuoka has emphasized the power of families for years20, and 
Morikawa (1980) of professional managers.  More recently, Morck and Nakamura(2004) 
emphasizes the maximixing behavior by zaibatsu families. Okazaki (1999) draws attention 
to the effective control by holding companies over the entire decision process of zaibatsu 
groups. Miyajima (2004) claims also that the opinion of family members, who were the 
organizing members of holding companies with unlimited liability, were important before 
the 1930s, when holding companies were converted into joint-stock companies with limited 
liabilities.21 Quoting mainly Mitsui’s case, where whole assets were held jointly by eleven 
families,22 Takeda (1995) claims that holding companies played the role of softening the 
“voice” of family members.  At any rate, it seems difficult to deny the ultimate control 
power by zaibatsu families.  Nevertheless, these families chose to delegate part of their 
power to professional managers in order to diversify family businesses in the field of heavy 
and chemical industries.   
 
 Cotton  Spinning  Firms  
 Let us move on to the case of cotton spinning companies.  In these companies, control 
right were delegated to professional managers and directors internally promoted after the 
1920s.  Yui (1995) considers that the major reasons for this lies in the drastic changes in 
competitive conditions.  After World War I these firms faced with severe competition with 
British firms with respect high quality products and Indian firms with respect to low 
                                                  
20  Refer to Yasuoka (1998) on this point. 
21  The main reason for this lied in tax saving. In order to mitigate the impact of the rise in inheritance tax 
rate in the wartime atmosphere, zaibatsu families converted their holding companies into joint-stock 
companies so as to be able to divide their wealth into small units owned by individual members.   
22  So called “soyusei” system was adopted by Mitsui, in which each family had income right to the profits in 
proportion of its equity, but never allowed to sell its equity.    Since “exit” by family members was forbidden, 
their “voice” tended to be louder, Takeda (1995) claims.   
 16quality products.  In order to survive the competition, it was indispensable to reorganize 
the managerial structure so as to improve the competitive edge of the companies.  At the 
top management level, old-type shareholding directors who had  been textile merchants 
mostly were replaced by professional managers, who were acquainted with new technology 
in production and new managerial system.  At the production site, three kinds of 
improvements were undertaken; (i) improvement of shop-floor coordination so as to 
effectively utilize work time and workers’ motions, (ii) diversification of routes for material 
purchasing and selection of materials suitable for each product, and (iii) diversification of 
products adjusted to each market and the consequent diversification of production lines. 
  In order to accomplish these improvements, the strategy of cotton spinning companies 
was to give incentive to invest in firm-specific skills by middle managers in charge of each 
factory.  This is why lifetime employment and seniority wage system was introduced with 
respect at to the middle management.  Further, internal promotion system extended to 
board members and president worked as a powerful incentive for middle managers. 
  It is important to note that structural reform of these companies, which eventually 
curtailed control right of shareholders, were undertaken with explicit approval by 
shareholders.    For example, reform of board system was only possible with the approval at 
shareholder meetings.  Instead of delegating control right to employees, shareholders 
requested high dividend.  Miyajima (2004) claim these companies were still under the 
pressure of disciplining through capital markets. 
  Incidentally, during the 1920s, the high dividend ratio of non-zaibatsu firms became a 
target of social criticism. Moral hazard such as tunneling and high dividend and bonus 
payment by deficit companies occurred frequently. In many cases,  moral hazard was 
caused by the collusion of large shareholders and top managers.  Kamekichi Takahashi 
published a book “Joint-stock Companies Ruin the Country” (Kabushikiki-kaisha 
Bôkokuron) in 1930.  During the 1930, this kind moral hazard subsided, and Takahashi 
claims that one of the major reasons for this was the shareholding of these companies by 
other large firms, which fulfilled effective monitoring role.   
 
  Landlord  System     
    The mechanism of delegation of control right to workers in order to promote technological 
progress is most clearly seen in the case of farm management by landlords.  In Japan, 
land-renting contract was overwhelmingly fixed rent system.  This stands in clear 
contrast to other East Asian economies, where share-cropping contract is a usual practice. 
We will show that the major reason for this difference lies in the difference in technological 
progress in two regions. 
   Let us start with discussing why we focus on agriculture in the examination of corporate 
governance system. 
 17From the viewpoint of asset-holders, corporate governance bears importance because it 
determines characteristics of investment in the corporate sector as an asset.  Therefore,  in 
a historical process, corporate governance tends to evolve in close relationship with the 
characteristics of assets alternative to corporate ownership.  Since most important asset 
alternative to stocks during the industrializing process was land or real estate, it is 
worthwhile to examine the asset-holding pattern of wealthy landlord. 
In prewar Japan, landlords were major wealth holders together with merchants.  Since 
many of merchants invested in land, and some of landlords were involved in commercial 
activities, there was no qualitative difference in the asset holding pattern between 
merchants and landlords23.    Of course, main source of income for landlords was rents paid 
by tenant farmers.    In Japan of the nineteenth century and thereafter, direct management 
of farm by landlords was very rare, and there were only very few agricultural workers.    
Most of lands held by landlords were rented to peasants.  Table 8 shows percentage 
composition of income by sources of a typical landlord in the South-Western part of Japan, 
a region with well-developed commercial and industrial activities.  Many of landlords 
were involved in money-lending activity utilizing their information network in rural areas, 
so that interest incomes from such activities as well as bank deposits were another source 
of income.  As industrialization proceeds, landlords invested their assets in stocks, both of 
local companies and of central and national-level companies, and obtained dividend income.   
Table 8 shows that the share of dividend income increased and the share of rent 
decreased.24   
Let us examine the nature of land as an asset, which was determined through tenancy 
contract.  First, tenancy contract was implemented by fixed-rent method; i.e., rent was 
fixed mostly by the amount of rice25 in the case of paddy field per a unit of land (tan).  
Share tenancy or share cropping was very rare, confined to very underdeveloped or 
mountainous areas in such peripheral prefectures as Aomori, Iwate, Nagano, Kumamoto,  
Okinawa, and so on.  Rents were sometimes reduced especially in seriously poor crop 
years, but never increased above contracted level in the years of good crops.  In other 
words, in the Japanese land contract system, residual income right did not resided in the 
hand of landlords (investors or asset holders) but belonged to tenant farmers.             
Second, it is interesting to note that tenant farmers enjoyed not only residual income 
                                                  
23  Osamu Saito pointed out a possibility that land holding or land accumulation by landlords was a 
passive behavior necessitated by the massive sale of land by peasants struck by deflations and recessions. I 
consider that this is not the case in view of the vast amount of literature about the portfolio selection by 
landlords regarding land and security investments. (See, for example, Nakamura 1979).   
24  This is a typical pattern in the case of landlords in developed region.    In less industrialized region of   
Northern Japan, the share of rent stayed very high throughout the prewar period. Incidentally, Shoji (2003)   
refers to the case of Ito-ke, the largest landlord in Niigata prefecture, who specialized in landholding 
through  
divesting commercial activities and committed itself to social activities as meiboka (Teranishi 2005).   
25  In the case of dry field, contract was in terms of rice or currency usually.     
 18right but also substantial degree of control right regarding rented land.  With respect to 
farming method, most of contract stipulated that agreement of landlords is required only in 
the case of significant changes of land use such as planting trees such as fruit trees or 
mulberry. Therefore, tenant farmers had wide range of control right over the use of rented 
land including the choice of crops, inputs of fertilizers, and marketing of harvested crops.  
Even re-renting of land and transaction of tenancy right was popularly undertaken.     
Delegation of both residual income and control right gave tenancy farmers high incentive 
to invest in firm (land)-specific skill such as irrigation control and land improvement.  
Especially active were small owner farmers, who rented arable land and expanded the 
scale of their business.  Such a behavior of tenant farmers resulted in a rise of their 
productivity compared with landlords (self-cultivation) and owner farmers as is shown by 
Table 9.26,  27 
  Why landlords delegated income and control right to tenant farmers?  In order to 
examine this point, let us compare Japan with contemporary East Asian countries.  In 
both East Asia and Japan agriculture is subject to monsoon climate, managed by family 
units, and mainly composed of rice production.  However, while fixed rent contract is a 
dominant pattern of tenancy contract in Japan, share-cropping is dominant in East Asia. 
    Table 10 shows basic information about Asian agriculture.    Gini-coefficient of land is low, 
indicating smallness of arable land per production unit.  The percentage of tenanted land 
is 10–30 percent, and the percentage of share-cropping is 50–90 percent except for 
Thailand.  Incidentally in terms of comparison among continents, the percentage of 
share-cropping is 89.5 percent in Asia, 0 percent in Africa, 16.1 percent in Latin America, 
12.5 percent in Europe, and 31.5 percent in North America (Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami 
1992). 
  Theoretically, sharecropping becomes an equilibrium contract pattern when contract 
enforcement costs are high, yield variability is high, and tenant farmers are risk averse, 
while fixd-rent contract is seen when contract enforcement costs are low, yield varibility is 
low, and tenant farmers are risk neutral (Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami1992).  This leads 
us to conjecture following hypothetical reasons for the difference in two regions. 
  First is the difference in yield variability28 and the degree of poverty of tenant farmers.  
It is already touched upon that in the case of Japan sharecropping is occasionally seen in 
                                                  
26  From the viewpoint of asset holders, land as an asset was more or less a fixed income asset, although   
changes in rice prices caused some price risks. 
27  Wataya (1959) and Ouchi (1952) claim that semi-tenant farmers or middle-sized farmers actively 
  engaged in technological improvement.   
28 It is important to note that fixed-rent system in Japan was usually accompanied by the widely spread 
practice of state-contingent rent reduction.    Arimoto (2004) examines the effect of this practice, and shows 
that if a tenant is not too risk averse and/or the variability of the yield is not too high, then fixed-rent 
contract with a state-contingent rent reduction is preferable for landlords to a fixed-rent contract or share 
tenancy. 
 19especially poor regions.  Asian farmers are very poor in general, as Hayami (1992) and 
Oshima (1987) claim.    However, it is not certain whether they are poor in comparison with 
tenant farmers in the prewar Japan.    Average income per farm household was 1,138 dollar 
in Japan (1960), 806 dollar in Taiwan (1966), 422 dollar is Korea (1965), 433 dollar in the 
Philippines (1965), 388 dollar in Thailand (1967/68), 421 dollar (1976), 470 dollar in 
Western Malaysia (1967/68) ( Oshima 1987).  Although the figure for Japan is 
extraordinarily high, it is partly owing to income compensation scheme adopted in the 
postwar period.  Further, in prewar Japan, there is a comparison of labor cost of workers 
at cotton spinning factories between India and Japan in 1891; 135.5 sen in Japan and 151.9 
sen in India per 600g of cotton yarn (Yamada 1934).  In India workers were male, and in 
Japan female at cotton spinning factories, so that we must take gender difference into 
consideration.    Since wage level of unskilled labor in manufacturing was close to the wage 
level in the agriculture, this seems to indicate that peasants were extremely poor in prewar 
Japan also. 
  As the second reason, one may point out difference in enforcement costs.  In East Asia, 
landlords intervenes tenant farming heavily.  For example, in the case of Philippines, 
landlords, usually managers employed by landlords, intervene severely with respect to the 
choice of rice variety, timing of planting and harvesting, use of fertilizer and pesticide 
(Umehara 1970).  In other words, residual control right of land is scarcely delegated to 
farmers.    This is quite different from Japan. 
    Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami (1992) claim that enforcement cost of contract was reduced 
significantly owing to strong community and family ties and its effect on reputation.  
Although this factor could be effective in explaining the difference between Asia and other 
continents, it is doubtful this could entail significant difference between Japan and other 
Asian countries, since it is a common understanding that in the rural area of the prewar 
Japan community tie was also very strong.29,30 
  If neither poverty nor enforcement costs are unable to explain the difference, what else 
could do so?   We consider the difference is closely related to the difference in the nature of 
technological progress.  In prewar Japan, the rate of technological progress in agriculture 
was substantially high, and the new technology was composed of introduction of 
high-yielding rice varieties that required delicate water control and soil improvement, 
carefully tailored to the conditions of individual farm lands.  The adoption of new 
improved variety was only possible with incremental technical improvement based on 
                                                  
29 Further, the level of intervention or the degree of delegation of control right depends on the nature of 
contract.    In this sense, both contract pattern and enforcement costs are emdogenous. 
30 One important difference is that in South East Asian countries tenants were quite often relatives or 
children, who work as tenants before land is given to them as inheritance.    This case is important because 
land is equally inherited by all children, while in the prewar Japan inheritance by the eldest son was a 
rule.  
 20investment in farm(land)-specific skill by tenant farmers.  In order to catch up the rapid 
diffusion of new variety and related technological know-how, it was optimal for landlords to 
delegate substantial control right over farming  t o  t e n a n t  f a r m e r s  s o  a s  t o  g i v e  t h e m  
incentive for investment in firm-specific skills.  Technological progress was also rapid in 
East Asia during the 1960s and 1970s owing to the Green Revolution with respect to 
high-yielding varieties of rice.  However, in the case of the new varieties in the Green 
Revolution, high yielding was possible only through large-scale irrigation, use of 
agricultural machinery, and mass input of fertilizers.    This required large operating funds, 
but did not need any kind of delicate skill formation at the farm level.     
 In sum, we consider that under the condition of rapid diffusion of new agricultural 
technology, control right of farmland was delegated to tenant farmers by the decision of 
landlords in order to induce the tenants to invest in firm(land)-specific skills 31 .  
Incidentally, let us give a piecemeal and preliminary evidence on the importance of 
technological factor.  In Hiroshima-prefecture of Western Japan that comprised of 16 
countries (gun).  While in most of counties fixed rent contract was prevalent, villages in 4 
counties located in mountainous areas, and island areas (Saiki, Takada, Koyatsu, Futami) 
are characterized by sharecropping (Noshomu-sho 1924, p. 104).  According to the data on 
the diffusion of new rice varieties given by Katsube (2002), in these areas the diffusion of 
the representative high-yielding variety, jinriki, is very low (p. 244).   
   
  Cross-shareholding  after  World  War  II 
  We have argued that the delegation of control right to employees was implemented as a 
result of maximizing behavior of owner families and controlling shareholders. After the war 
these wealthy families and shareholders disappeared due to zaibatsu dissolution and land 
reform. The shares held by zaibatsu families, amounting 57 percent of the total paid-in 
capital of corporate firms at the end of 1945, were sold out to the public, and land held by 
landlords, amounting to 28 percent of the total arable land in the country, were transferred 
to tenant farmers. The number of individual shareholder increased from 1,674 thousand in 
1945 to 4,191 thousand in 1949, and the percentage of rented land in total arable land 
decreased from 46 percent in 1946 to 13 percent in 1949. 
 During the slump of stock market from December 1949 through 1950, there occurred 
several attempts of hostile takeovers by those who obtained huge profit in the boom due to 
the Korean War. Targets included Fuji Electric, Sumitomo Electric, Nihon Electric, Taishô 
Insurance, and Yôwa Real Estate and so on. This gave rise to a move to cross-shareholding 
                                                  
31  Incidentally, through an examination of a couple of large landlords, Shoji (2003) argues that the 
improvement of farming technology by tenants and the support by landlords therewith were beneficial for 
both parties, and suggests that the behind such a benevolent behavior by landlords was skepticism about 
the private landholding system. 
 
 21by the ex-zaibatsu companies. Shacho-kai (president meeting) of each ex-zaibatu group 
took the role of organizing cross-shareholding and the banks in each group lent necessary 
funds actively. Partly owing to the impact of capital liberalization after 1964 when Japan 
became a member of OECD, the percentage of cross-shareholding increased toward the 
1970s (Table 12).     
  It is interesting to ask who were the ultimate decision makers with respect this 
cross-shareholding and for what purpose. One possible answer would be to emphasize the 
role of managers who were motivated by the pursuit of private benefits or empire building. 
It is difficult to deny this aspect completely, and it seems that, the later the period, the 
stronger would have been this entrenchment effect. However, as far as the initiation of the 
cross-shareholding is concerned, we would like to conjecture that this was the result of the 
joint decision by managers and shareholders, and the purpose lied in the increase of firm 
value by means of encouraging firm-specific investment by employees. Such a motivation 
was based on the recognition that in view of the critical conditions of international balance 
of payments, enhancement competitiveness of products in international markets was the 
only way for the survival of the companies, and that product and process innovation based 
on firm-specific investment was the most effective method to accomplish the purpose.   
  Let us raise a few supporting evidence for this conjecture.  First, owing to the wartime 
emphasis on producer right, factory chiefs had accumulated enough competencies to run 
the firms, and these people were recruited as top managers after the war because of the 
purge of the top management in charge of wartime economy. Second, since the war 
economy required significant amount of additional funds, which even zaibatsu could not 
afford to finance, rationing of shares to other companies in the same group was already a 
common practice among zaibatsu firms (Teranishi 1994). Even cross-shareholding was 
extensively undertaken by some of new zaibatsu groups. Third, the eruption of intense 
labor dispute after the war induced the corporate managers to emphasize the “right to 
manage”, and various national organizations had been organized in order to assert the role 
of managers in corporate governance. Moreove r ,  i t  m u s t  b e  n o t i c e d that there was no 
effective legal measures to protect management from the threat of takeovers such as poison 
pill32, purchase of own shares, requirement to disclose of shares purchase, and the like at 
that time (Goto 1992). It follows that cross-shareholding was the only way to protect the 
managements and to avoid harmful effects on the firm value, so that there was no reason 
for the dispersed small shareholders to oppose the cross-shareholding.   
    
 
 
                                                  
32  Poison pill was introduced in1982 in the US in its prototype form and became legally legitimate in 
mid-1980s. 
 223.  The Future of Shareholder Right: Concluding Remarks 
 
  We have derived two propositions with respect to the historical origin of the weak 
investor right in Japan. (i) The delegation of control right to employees occurred gradually 
from the top to the bottom ; at first the top management obtained substantial autonomy, 
then    control right was granted to the middle management, and finally, shop-floor workers 
acquired autonomy in their jobs. (ii) The delegation of control right was implemented by 
the decision of controlling shareholders who tried to increase the firm value by encouraging 
investment in firm-specific skills by employees. These propositions indicate that the weak 
investor right and the bank-centered financial system are not necessarily the evidence of 
“underdevelopment” of    corporate governance mechanism and financial system.     
    On the other hand, the Japanese government has been activity committed to promote the 
working of capital markets. The deregulation of financial markets since around 1980 was 
the main measure for this purpose.   The deregulation was started in order to maintain 
the effectiveness of monetary policy through accommodating the internationalization of the 
financial system.  Then, the emphasis shifted to the conversion of the financial system 
form bank-centered to capital market-based system, and further, to the promotion of 
international competitiveness of financial industries in the global capital markets. 
  More recently, in view of the trouble in the banking sector that used to have played the 
role of main bank monitoring, reform of corporate governance system in the direction to 
emphasize the share value maximization and to emphasize the benefits of shareholders 
became the focal issue.  In 1993 the fee of representative shareholder litigation was 
reduced and became uniform; in 1993 appointment of outside auditor became mandatory; 
in 1994 purchase of own share is partially liberalized; in 1997 establishment of pure 
holding companies became liberalized, and in 1997 stock option became allowed.  The 
reform of the commercial law that became effective in March 2003 was the highlight of 
these reforms, by which firms were allowed to choose a new corporate board system similar 
to the United States system.33  
   It seems, however, that despite these reform efforts, changes in corporate governance  
and bank-centered financial system have been rather slow until now. With respect to the 
reform of board system, the number of firms that adopted US-type board system, called 
Iinkai-to-Sechi-Kaisha, is only 101, of which 19 is composed of Hitachi group, a 
manufacturing group with high reputation but recently stagnant, as of February 2005.  
With respect to cross-shareholding, cross and stable shareholding by banks and other 
                                                  
33  Nevertheless, the legal system of Japan regarding corporate governance seems to be still very 
underdeveloped. In particular, as the cross-shareholding by financial institutions decreased, how to protect 
corporate managers from hostile take-over by such legal measures as poison pill has become a hot issue 
recently.  
 23financial institutions has decreased substantially after 1997 as is shown in Table 11.    This 
is partly due to the introduction of market valuation of stockholding under the new 
accounting standard.  In response to the drastic mergers among ex-zaibatsu banks since 
the mid-1990s, the cross-shareholding among large business groups has decreased 
substantially (Table 12).  It must be noted, however, that cross-shareholding among 
non-financial firms did not decrease so much, and relation-based shareholding has 
increased significantly after 1997 (Table 11).    Part of the reason for such a move lies in the 
expected lift of ban on mergers by foreigners by means of stock transfer scheduled in 2006 
and in the conversion of internal division activities to external subsidiaries34.  Another 
reason, however, is the reorganization of inter-firm relationship in order to promote 
relation-specific investment and to enhance technological cooperation. 
  It would be also surprising that high-degree of financial intermediation has been by and 
large kept in tact until now.    Table 13 indicates that percentage of household assets held in 
the form of deposits did not show any noticeable trend throughout the postwar period35.  
Further, while large firms decreased their dependence on borrowings recently because of 
the increased issue of corporate bonds, the dependence of all firms on borrowing did not 
change significantly until now. 
  It seems that the pattern of working of the corporate system and capital markets in 
Japan is rooted in long-term trial and error process of institutional reforms and the choice 
of corporate and, probably, national growth strategy. This paper tried to show that weak 
investor right, or the delegation of control right to employees, occurred as a result of 
maximizing behavior by asset holders, who intended to increase firm value by adapting to 
rapid changes in technology and industrial structure. Our investigation is still very   
preliminary and many things remain to be done in the future.    There is no doubt, however, 
that it is difficult to change it simply by resorting to regulatory reforms or disciplining of 
corporate managers.  Neither would be effective to “educate” investors in various ways.  
Recent recommendation by government officials to promote investor education at 
elementary and junior high school level seems to be guided by a serious ignorance about 
the mechanism of institutional changes.  Globalization of financial markets and the 
consequent homogenization of institutions is certainly a serious challenge for the on-going 
system.  Whether or not we should adjust to or resist it, however, must be decided on the 
basis of careful evaluation of future growth strategy; a stronger investor right would 
enhance allocation efficiency of financial resources, but it could be harmful to 
organizational efficiency based on investment in firm-specific skills. 
                                                  
34  I owe to Yutaka Kosai for the comments on these points. 
35  Part of the reason lies in the incompleteness of the pay-off system in Japan. The pay-off started from 
April 2005 does not include deposits for settlements such as demand deposits. In other words, demand 
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1888 41.5    8.1  68.6  13.6 
1900 34.6  15.4  72.7  13.3 
1920 24.7  19.0  58.4  30.4 
1938 15.9  32.4  38.1  51.4 
1955 16.7  12.6  35.4  39.1 
1987   2.8  28.4  14.3  75.2 
 
Source:  Minami  (1992). 
 
Note:    Percentage composition of seven-year moving average series.    Primary sector includes 
agriculture, fishing and foresting, and industrial sector, manufacturing and mining.  Heavy and 
chemical industry is composed of metal, chemical and machinery.  Data 1888 on manufacturing 
sector composition refer to data in 1877. 
 
 
 28Table 2    Diversification by Three Zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi and    Sumitomo) 
 
 
 1896  1914  1919  1945 
Traditional businesses    96(92) 652(82)  2,461(83)  2,107(28) 
Heavy and chemical industries  2(2) 53(7)  301(10)  4,683(63) 
Others 6(6)  91(11)  214(7)  651(9) 
Total 104  796  2,976  7,431 
 
Source:    Takeda (1995) and Hadley (1970). 
 
Note:  Traditional business includes mining, marine transportation, foreign trade and banking.  Heavy 
and chemical industries are metal, chemical and machinery.  Units are one million yen, and 
figures in parentheses are percentages.  From 1986 through 1919, figures show values of 
investment or total assets, and figures in 1945 refer to paid-in capital (excluding investment in 
colonial regions).   
 
 29Table 3    Average Percentage Composition of Bonus Payments to Managers   
and Dividend Payments in Profits after Tax (Prewar) 
 
 
    Manager bonus / 
profits after tax 
Dividend / 
profits after tax 
(A) 1922     
 zaibatsu  firms  5.3  77.8 
 non–zaibatsu  firms  4.8  86.5 
      
(B) 1932 (firms established before 1922)     
 zaibatsu  firms  4.9  57.3 
 non–zaibatsu  firms  3.7  63.8 
    
(C) 1932 (firms established after 1932)     
 zaibatsu  firms  4.5  54.8 
 non–zaibatsu  firms  3.6  47.8 
 
Note:  Sample of (A) and (B) are 22 firms belonging to four big zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo 
and Yasuda) and 65 other firms given both in Kabushiki-kaisha-nenkan No.1 (1922) and No. 14 
(1936).  Sample of (C) are 50 firms of four big zaibatsu and 376 other firms.  Data for them are 
obtained in No. 14 of Kabushiki-kaisha-nenkan.  Firms are those belonging to manufacturing, 
mining and transportation and public utility, so that financial and service industries are not 
included.  
 
 30Table 4    The Rise of Professional Managers 
 
 
   1905 1915  1930 
(A) Number of professional managers in a company   
  Less than 2  69    86  42 
  More than 2    5    29  113 
  Total number of companies  75  115  158 
        
(B) Share of professional managers on the board of director       
 Less  than  one-third  –  50  20 
  More than one-third  –  19  45 
  Total number of companies  –  69  65 
        
(C)Career Path of professional managers       
 Internally  promoted    8  –  247 
 Other  career  path  28  –  224 
  Total number of managers  36  –  470 
 
Source:    Morikawa (1980) and (1991). 
Note:    Figures show number of companies in panel A and B, and number of managers in panel C. In panel 
A and C, total includes unknowns.




 1970  1980 
(a)Dividend / profits after tax  42.8  22.6 
(b)Bonus to mangers / profits 
after tax 
 1.4   1.4 
(c)Dividend / (profits after tax + 
bonus to regular employees) 
27.7 11.4 
(d)Bonus to managers / (profits 
after tax + bonus to regular 
employees) 
 0.9   0.7 
(e)Bonus to regular employees / 





Source and Note:   Sample is 1,337 companies in 1970 and 1,589 companies in 1980 given in the Database 
of Development Bank of Japan. Bonus to regular employees is not given in the database.( Only total wages 
and salaries are given.)  But we can calculate the ratio of special earnings to the sum of special earnings 
and contract cash flow earnings from Chingin Kouzo Kihon Tokei Chosa (total firms with more than one 
thousand employees), which is 0.23 in 1970 and 0.26 in 1980. Bonus payment to regular employees is 
estimated by multiplying these ratios to the wages and salaries given for the sample companies. 
 32Table 6    Establishment of Holding Companies 
 
 
1909 Mitsui–Gômei   
1912 Yasuda–Hozensha 









 33Table 7    Number of Firms by Types of   
                 V o t i n g   R i g h t s   ( p e r c e n t   i n   p a r e n t h e s e s )  
 
 
 One  vote 
for one   
share 




   National  bank 







in some other 
measures 
  
1872–1876   3(50)   2  –   1  –    6  
1877–1885   2(6)  14  3  15  –   34 
1886–1889   12(15)  15  1  42  8   78 
1890–1892   5(31)   1  –   9  1   16 
1893–1896   63(61)  20  – 18  2  103 
1897–1900  26(76)   2  4   2  –   34 
 
Source:    Imuta (1976), p. 206. 
 
 
 34Table 8    Percentage Composition of Revenue of 
          a  Landlord  (Nozaki-ke)  in  Kinki  Region 
 
 








1905 62.1    5.4  30.7  – 
1907 63.9    –  35.5  – 
1909 61.2    9.1  29.5  – 
1911 43.4  16.0  37.4  3.6 
1913 38.8  22.9  34.4  3.5 
1915  22.3    6.8.  66.4  4.4 
1917 19.3    5.9  71.2  3.3 
1919 31.0    2.0  63.4  2.8 
1921 18.2    3.4  74.7  3.4 
1923 14.4  11.0  69.5  3.3 
1925 22.9    3.3  67.3  5.7 
1927 21.1  12.6  60.3  6.0 
 
Source:  Nakamura  (1979). 
 
Note:    Other includes rent on houses.    Temporary incomes are excluded. 
 
 
 35Table 9    Land Productivity of Various Types of Farmers 
 
 
 Landlords  Owner  farmers  Tenanted  farmers 
1890 4.6  2.9  2.7 
1899 4.6  3.0  2.7 
1908 4.2  3.1  3.2 
1911 3.2  3.0  2.7 
1912 3.0  2.9  3.2 
   1939–41   3.8  3.7 
 
Source:    Hayami (1986) and Kawagoe (1993). 
 
Note:    Kg / ha of brown rice. 
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Table 10    Agriculture of Asia and Latin-America 
 
 











of tenanted   
land with 
share-cropping 
Bangladesh 1976/77    1.6  0.42  20.9  91.0 
India  1970/71    2.3 0.62    8.5  48.0 
Indonesia  1973    1.1  0.56  23.6  60.0 
Nepal  1971/72    1.0 0.56  13.2  48.3 
Philippine  1971    3.6  0.51  32.8  79.3 
Thailand  1978    3.7  0.45  15.5  29.0 
          
Brazil  1970   59.7  0.84  10.2   n.a. 
Costa  Rika  1973   38.1  0.82   9.0   9.4 
Colombia 1970/71    26.3 0.86  11.5  49.4 
Peru 1971/72    16.9  0.91 13.6    0.0 
Uruguay 1970  214.9 0.82  46.3    4.7 
Venezuela  1971   91.9  0.91   2.4   n.a 
 




Table 11    Cross Shareholding of Listed Firms (Percentages to Total Equity Outstanding) 
 
 
  Stable holding by 
financial institutions 





 Cross   
shareholding 
















1987 7.7  31.3    10.6    3.1 14.5  45.8 
1988  8.0  32.3     9.9   2.8  13.4  45.7 
1989  8.1  31.3     9.1   3.7  13.5  44.9 
1990  8.3  31.5     9.6   3.7  14.1  45.6 
1991  8.5  31.8     9.3   3.9  13.8  45.6 
1992  8.4  31.8     9.4   3.8  13.9  45.7 
1993  8.1  31.2     9.3   4.1  14.1  45.2 
1994  8.2  31.1     9.1   4.0  13.8  44.9 
1995  8.3  29.8     8.8   4.1  13.6  43.4 
1996  8.6  29.8     7.5   4.5  12.3  42.1 
1997  8.3  28.9     6.7   4.6  11.6  40.5 
1998  7.3  26.7     6.0   7.0  13.2  39.9 
1999 6.0  22.0      4.6  11.1 15.9  37.9 
2000  5.8  20.7     4.2   7.9  12.3  33.0 
2001  5.3  18.8     3.6   7.8  11.4  30.2 
2002  4.3  17.0     3.2   6.9  10.0  27.1 
2003  3.8  13.9     3.8   6.5  10.4  24.3 
 
Source:  Nissei-Kiso  Kenkyujyo,  Kabushik Mochiai-jyokyo Chosa. 
 
Note:  Covers all the listed firms; 1924 companies in 1987 and  2690 companies in 2003.  Stable 









 (A)    (B) 
  1955  1965 1975  1985 1987    1987  2000 
Mitsui  – 14.3 21.2  21.6 19.5    10.2    5.1 
Mitsubishi 20.3  23.7  30.3 36.9  35.5    14.8  11.3 
Sumitomo  21.2  28.0 29.6  29.7 27.5    13.4    8.9 
Fuji –  11.4  18.3  16.4  16.4    11.2    4.6 
Sanwa  –  –  20.3  16.5  16.5     9.4   4.9 
Daiichi-kangin – 21.9  23.8  14.6  14.6     9.1   6.2 
 
Source:  Data in Panel (A) are obtained from Kôsei Torihiki Iinkai (1992), and show average percentages 
of group firms of the percentages of stocks held by other firms in the same group.  Data  in  Panel 
(A) are from Nissei Kiso Kenkyujyo, Kabushiki Mochiai-jôkyô Chô a (2000) and shows 
percentages of the sum of the values of stocks held by firms in the same group to total value of 






Table 13    Intermediation by Banks 
 
 
 Percentage  of   
deposits in household 
financial assets 
Percentage of borrowing in 
financing of corporate firms 
   All  firms  Large  firms 
1960 –  48.2  56.1 
1965 60.1  45.7  48.2 
1970 62.6  42.1  43.7 
1975 64.3  45.3  46.2 
1980 64.3  43.1  42.7 
1985 58.5  47.7  43.8 
1990 53.9  50.6  43.9 
1995 55.7  52.0  41.8 
2000 53.1  49.2  38.9 
2002 56.4  49.8  39.4 
 
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Data, and Ministry of Treasures, Financial Statistics 
of Corporate Firms. 
 
Note:  All firms are composed of all corporate firms with equity capital more than ten million yen, and 
large firms with equity capital more than one billion yen. 
 
 
 